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source: ADPC

XAAZ-143/3

18 May 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR MESSRS. [REDACTED]

EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: OPC T/O

1. I had a conversation with [REDACTED] Monday morning in which he expressed to me a certain amount of concern as regards [REDACTED] [REDACTED] a comment about what he says appears to him to be a "triplication" of area specialists in our set-up [REDACTED] [REDACTED] I agreed that I would bring his remarks to your attention, that we would give the problem further consideration and that as soon as possible we would give him the benefit of our collective reactions.

2. The following represents my understanding of the point [REDACTED] [REDACTED] He expressed himself as understanding and being in general agreement with our overall structural set-up and further as being in agreement with our need for both functional and area specialists on the planning side. However, he is worried about what he calls a doubling up of area specialists on the planning side--especially when he feels that the operational side will inevitably develop area specialists (hence the "triplication"). He expressed general approval of the idea of the functional chiefs on the planning side having their own area specialists integrated with them but he questions the necessity for the special group of geographic experts in addition. He suggested that it might be wiser to give this group to the operations people. He reasoned that unless we do so, we are in a sense negating our concept of having an operations side sufficiently knowledgeable areawise to exercise its prerogative of influencing the form and scope of the projects devised by the planning side. One of the things which has caught his eye in this connection is that the planning T/O apparently calls for two kinds of area researchers.

3. In the discussion, which lasted about 35 minutes, I made a number of points which I stated were by way of tentative responses to the questions raised [REDACTED] I made it clear that I was not endeavoring to answer specifically as I wanted to consult with you all. I stressed the fact that we are making a serious effort to have a very strong planning side and that we are going to give our organizational set-up a full and fair chance to prove itself. We are, therefore, doing a number of things

to strengthen

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to strengthen the planning side with a view to avoiding or at least minimizing the danger that the operations side will tend to run away with the show. The operations side does not have so much need for area specialists in its Washington staff as does the planning side, by virtue of the fact that the operations side has or will inevitably develop its own area experts in the field. To a very large extent the Washington staff of the operations side will be guided by the suggestions and recommendations of its foreign field chiefs and their staffs who, if they are not experts in their area when they go there, will shortly become such.

4. In conclusion it is my desire to be as reasonable as possible in our ultimate response [redacted] If we do in fact have a duplication of area experts and area researchers on the planning side, we should by all means consider this very closely to be absolutely sure that we need and want them. Entirely apart from [redacted] position, we certainly do not want to overload the boat and more particularly, we do not want to create a situation within our own planning staff which will result in conflicting pools of power with all of the jealousies and frustrations that are inherent in such a condition. [redacted]

[redacted] We must emphasize quality of personnel over quantity and we must never forget that matters of the nature which we work on can be much better dealt with by a highly select group of capable individuals than by large masses of mediocrities. If we set ourselves too high a goal in terms of staff personnel, the inevitable tendency will be to "fill the slots" with second best people if we find that top quality people are not available. I feel that I have had enough experience in these matters to warrant my saying that we do not want to take the risk of breaking our own backs with the problems of administering too many people. (The good people who we have will be completely occupied with taking care of and cleaning up the messes created by the inferior ones. [redacted])

[redacted] Moreover, we will surely subject ourselves to criticism from all quarters, even including our friends, if we have what appears to be too large a group. There is also involved the very important question of security, since there is no way in which to keep even partially under the bushel a Washington organization that is too large. [redacted]

* We should take note of and profit by the mistakes which have been made by our predecessors in this field. The many splendid accomplishments of the OSS were tarnished and bedimmed by the stupidities committed in various areas where the organization had inferior representatives. Consider also the current reputation abroad and even in Washington of the CIA operation.

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AREA OR COUNTRY(S)	Approved For Release 2008/10/29 : CIA-RDP83-00036R000400070024-3	DOC DATE CLASS
HQ	OPC	CA SUP
	Organization Planning	18 May 1949

IDENTIFICATION OF DOCUMENT

25X1 Memo (draft) from [] ADPC] to Messrs. [] 25X1
25X1 [] Subject: OPC T/O.

ABSTRACT NOTATION REFERENCES

Report on Conversation with [] on OPC Organizational
setup. 25X1

DOCUMENT LOCATION

HS/CSG - 590 ✓

